Dan Robinson gives the sixth of eight lectures on Reid's critique of
David Hume at Oxford. In the third of his "Essays on The Intellectual
Powers of Man", Thomas Reid devotes the fourth chapter to the concept of
'identity', and the sixth chapter to Locke's theory of 'personal
identity'. This latter chapter is widely regarded as a definitive
refutation of the thesis that personal identity is no more than memories
of a certain sort, less a "bundle of perceptions". As he says, "This
conviction of one's own identity is utterly necessary for all exercise
of reason. The operations of reason—whether practical reasoning about
what to do or speculative reasoning in the building up of a theory—are
made up of successive parts. In any reasoning that I perform, the early
parts are the foundation of the later ones, and if I didn't have the
conviction that the early parts are propositions that I have approved or
written down, I would have no reason to proceed to the later parts in
any theoretical or practical project whatever".
Under "David Hume", the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins with,
"The most important philosopher ever to write in English". His most
formidable contemporary critic was the fellow Scot, Thomas Reid, the
major architect of so-called Scottish Common Sense Philosophy. The most
significant features of Hume's work, as understood by Reid, are the
representive theory of perception, the nature of causation and causal
concepts, the nature of personal identity and the foundations of
morality. Each of these topics is presented in a pair of lectures, the
first summarizing Hume's position and the second Reid's critique of that
position.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario