Mi artículo sobre el dramatismo de Hobbes, en dos versiones escritas, y con una introducción en audio:
_____. "How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." AI podcast on José Angel García Landa's paper. Online audio at Academia 24 May 2026.*
https://www.academia.edu/68132891/
2026
Thomas Hobbes's materialist explication of the doctrine of the Trinity in Leviathan (Part III, "Of a Christian Common-Wealth"), on the basis of his dramatistic notion of personation as central to all aspects of human reality and social life.
Of the Trinity
Here wee have the Person of God born now the third time. For as Moses, and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament; and our Saviour himselfe as Man, during his abode on earth: So the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors, in the Office of Preaching, and Teaching, that had received the Holy Spirit, have Represented him ever since. But a Person, (as I have shewn before, chapt. [16].) is he that is Represented, as often as hee is Represented; and therefore God, who has been Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons; through neither the word Person, nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible. St. John indeed (I Epist. 5.7.) saith, There be three that bear witnesse in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these Three are One: But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three Persons in the proper signification of Persons; which is, that which is Represented by another. For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses, is one Person; and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person; and as Represented by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority from them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is the Person of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was whereof these three bare witnesse. St. John therefore tells us (verse 11.) that they bear witnesse, that God hath given us eternall life in his Son. Again, if it should bee asked, wherein that testimony appeareth, the Answer is easie; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly by his Son himself; and lastly by his Apostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times Represented the Person of God; and either prophecyed, or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the Apostles, it was the Character of the Apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles, to bear Witnesse of his Resurrection; as appeareth exprssely (Acts I. ver. 21, 22.) where St. Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot, useth these words, Of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning at the Baptisme of John, unto that same day that hee was taken up from us, must one bee ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his Resurrection: which words interpret the bearing of Witnesse, mentioned by St. John. There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of Witnesses in Earth. For (ver. 8.) he saith, there are three that bear Witnesse in Earth, the Spirit, and the Water, and the Bloud; and these three agree in one: that is to say, the graces of Gods Spirit, and the two Sacraments, Baptisme, and the Lords Supper, which all agree in one Testimony, to assure the consciences of beleevers, of eternall life; of which Testimony he saith (verse 10.) He that beleeveth on the Son of man hath the Witnesse in himselfe. In this Trinity on Earth the Unity is not of the thing; for the Spirit, the Water, and the Bloud, are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony: But in the Trinity of Heaven, the Persons are the persons of one an the same God, though Represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this: that God who is alwaies One and the same, was the Person Represented by Moses; the Person Represented by his Son Incarnate; and the Person Represented by the Apostles. As Represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spake, is God; As Represented by his Son (that was God and Man), the Son is that God; As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: From whence we may gather the reason why those names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Tesament: For they are Persons, that is, they have their names from Representing; which could not be, till divers men had Represented Gods Person in ruling, or in directing under him.
Thus
we see how the Power Ecclesiasticall was left by our Saviour to the
Apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better exercise
that Power,) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called
sometime in the New Testament Paracletus which signifieth an Assister, or one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly translated a Comforter. Let us now consider the Power it selfe, what it was, and over whom.
Hobbes's generalized notion of Person and Personation as a building block of human reality and a tool for social-dramatistic analysis is further commented here:
"How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 10 Oct. 2015.
Academia 14 Jan. 2022.*
https://www.academia.edu/68132891/
2022
—oOo—
How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and Social Representation: https://www.academia.edu/68132891/
How to Make Artificial Persons: Hobbes's Dramatistic Theory of Interaction and of Political Representation https://www.academia.edu/62311936/
Retropost, 2014:
Una lección básica sobre la teatralidad de la vida cotidiana. A truth of masks, o the role of roles, tal como se expone en The Social Construction of Reality, de Peter L. Berger y Thomas Luckmann.
Los roles sociales se basan en la socialización secundaria que sigue a la socialización primaria del individuo—a su adquisición de una identidad social y de un mundo en la niñez: "La socialización secundaria es la internalización de 'sub-mundos' institucionalizados o basados en instituciones. Así pues, su extensión y su carácter quedan determinados por la complejidad de la división del trabajo y de la distribución social del conocimiento que va aparejada con ella" (1966: 158) "Esto hace posible separar una parte del yo y la realidad que la acompaña para considerarlos relevantes sólo para la situación específica del papel que esté en cuestión. Así, el individuo establece una distancia entre su identidad total y la realidad que va con ella por una parte, y la identidad parcial específica del rol o papel, y su realidad, por otra. Este importante logro se vuelve posible sólo una vez ha tenido lugar la socialización primaria. Dicho en términos simplistas, es más fácil que el niño 'se esconda' de su maestro que de su madre. Y conversamente, podemos decir que el desarrollo de esta capacidad 'de esconderse' es una parte importante del proceso de crecer y volverse adulto" (1966: 162) |
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Social roles are based on secondary socialization following the individual's primary acquisition of a social identity and a world in childhood: "Secondary socialization is the internalization of institutional or institution-based 'sub-worlds'. Its extent and character are therefore determined by the complexity of the division of labour and the concomitant social distribution of knowledge" (1966: 158) "This makes it possible to detach a part of the self and its concomitant reality as relevant only to the role-specific situation in question. The individual then establishes distance between his total self and its reality on the one hand, and the role-specific partial self and its reality on the other. This important feat is possible only after primary socialization has taken place. Put crudely once more, it is easier for the child 'to hide' from his teacher than from his mother. Conversely, it is possible to say that the development of this capacity 'to hide' is an important aspect of the process of growing into adulthood" (1966: 162) |
Dan Robinson gives the sixth of eight lectures on Reid's critique of
David Hume at Oxford. In the third of his "Essays on The Intellectual
Powers of Man", Thomas Reid devotes the fourth chapter to the concept of
'identity', and the sixth chapter to Locke's theory of 'personal
identity'. This latter chapter is widely regarded as a definitive
refutation of the thesis that personal identity is no more than memories
of a certain sort, less a "bundle of perceptions". As he says, "This
conviction of one's own identity is utterly necessary for all exercise
of reason. The operations of reason—whether practical reasoning about
what to do or speculative reasoning in the building up of a theory—are
made up of successive parts. In any reasoning that I perform, the early
parts are the foundation of the later ones, and if I didn't have the
conviction that the early parts are propositions that I have approved or
written down, I would have no reason to proceed to the later parts in
any theoretical or practical project whatever".
Under "David Hume", the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins with,
"The most important philosopher ever to write in English". His most
formidable contemporary critic was the fellow Scot, Thomas Reid, the
major architect of so-called Scottish Common Sense Philosophy. The most
significant features of Hume's work, as understood by Reid, are the
representive theory of perception, the nature of causation and causal
concepts, the nature of personal identity and the foundations of
morality. Each of these topics is presented in a pair of lectures, the
first summarizing Hume's position and the second Reid's critique of that
position.
Según Miguel de Unamuno (en La Agonía del Cristianismo):
Habría que distinguir, ante todo, entre la realidad y la personalidad del sujeto histórico. Realidad deriva de res (cosa) y personalidad de persona. El judío saduceo Carlos Marx creía que son las cosas las que hacen y llevan a los hombres, y de aquí su concepción materialista de la Historia, su materialismo histórico—que podríamos llamar realismo—; pero los que queremos creer que son los hombres, que son las personas, los que hacen y llevan a las cosas, alimentamos, con duda y en agonía, la fe en la concepción histórica de la Historia, en la concepción personalista o espiritualista.
Persona, en latín, era el actor de tragedia o de la comedia, el que hacía un papel en ésta. La personalidad es la obra que en la Historia se cumple.
¿Cuál fue el Sócrates histórico, el de Jenofonte, el de Platón, el de Aristófanes? El Sócrates histórico, el inmortal, no fue el hombre de carne y hueso y sangre que vivió en tal época en Atenas, sino que fue el que vivió en cada uno de los que le oyeron, y de todos estos se formó el que dejó su alma a la Humanidad. Y él, Sócrates, vive en ésta.
¡Triste doctrina! ¡Sin duda... la verdad en el fondo es triste! ... "¡Triste está mi alma hasta la muerte!" (Marc., XV., 34). ¡Dura cosa tener que consolarse con la Historia! Triste está el alma hasta la muerte, pero es la carne la que le entristece. "¡Desgraciado hombre de mí!, ¿quién me librará de este cuerpo de muerte?" (Rom., VII, 24), clamaba San Pablo.
Y este cuerpo de muerte es el hombre carnal, fisiólógico, la cosa humana, y el otro, el que vive en los demás, en la Historia, es el hombre histórico. Sólo que el que vive en la Historia quiere vivir también en la carne, quiere arraigar la inmortalidad del alma en la resurrección de la carne. Y fue la agonía de San Pablo. La Historia, por otra parte, es realidad, tanto o más que la Naturaleza. La persona, es cosa, porque cosa deriva de causa. Y hasta narrando historia se hace historia. Las doctrinas personales de Carlos Marx, el judío saduceo que creía que las coas hacen a los hombres. Ha producido cosas. Entre otras, la actual revolución rusa. Por lo cual anduvo mucho más cerca de la realidad histórica Lenin, cuando, al decirle de algo que reñía con la realidad, replica: "¡Tanto peor para la realidad!" Si bien tomó esto de Hegel.
