Implicarse en el juego: Filosofía del fútbol

 Implicarse en el juego: Filosofía del fútbol https://www.academia.edu/34526973/

7 Hume’s “Sentimentalist” Theory of Morals - Reid's Critique of Hume

The Mousetrap

 

Interaction as Reality-Maintenance

 Some notions on representation, interaction, discourse, and reality, from Berger & Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality.

The social reality we inhabit must be constantly constructed and reconstructed and reproduced through socialization. Berger & Luckmann differentiate the primary socialization acquired in childhood, which gives the individual a social identity, and secondary socialization, e.g. education, professional training, etc., which gives the individual a number of roles in society, a profession or provisional identity which may be more or less fluid or permanent according to circumstances and social complexity.

The social reality is a system of institutions, externally speaking, but they must be interiorized by the individual to become a subjective reality—through a number of techniques. "The more these techniques make subjectively plausible a continuity between the original and the new elements of knoweldge, the more readily they acquire the accent of reality" (163); just as we build a second language knowledge on our mother tongue, we build secondary socializations on our primary socialization. In complex societies there is a socializing personnel (e.g. teachers) who may become significant others to the subject—especially if the secondary socialization requires intensity and dedication, a commitment of the self-identity so to speak. Socializing tasks vary much from one society to another, just as the distribution of knowledge.

Maintenance and Transformation of Subjective Reality.

"Since socialization is never complete and the contents it internalizes face continuing threats to their subjective reality, every viable society must develop procedures of reality-maintenance to safeguard a measure of symmetry between objective and subjective reality" (167)

"Primary socialization internalizes a reality apprehended as inevitable. This internalization may be deemed successful if the sense of inevitability is present most of the time, at least while the individual is active in the world of everyday life". There are the sinister psychological metamorphoses of reality threatening it, usually marginally; mental distortions of reality which must be kept under control in the individual's subjectivity. "There are also the more directly threatening competing definitions of reality that may be encountered socially" (167)—people living with other cultural assumptions, in another reality so to speak.

If a secondary socialization is to be strongly internalized, the socialization procedures (discipline, control, etc.) will have to be intensified and reinforced accordingly. (E.g. the military, the clergy...);

"the reality of everyday life maintains itself by being embodied in routines, which is the essence of institutionalization. Beyond this, howerver, the reality of everyday life is ongoingly reaffirmed in the individual's interaction with others. Just as reality is originally internalized by a social process, so it is maintained in consciousness by social processes. These latter processes are not drastically different from those of the earlier internalization. They also reflect the basic fact that subjective reality must stand in a relationship with an objective reality that is socially defined" (169).

So, reality (the human reality of individuals, projects, actions, institutions, customs, etc.) is made and remade through interaction—this much Berger & Luckmann share with other propounders of symbolic interactionism.  Reality is made (to put it otherwise) of a collectively sustained set of self-fulfilling expectations.

Due to their interactionalist account of socialization, Berger and Luckmann are ideally placed as major theorizers of what I used to call the relational self—the notion that the self is not a substance with a stable core but rather a dynamic system of social relationships—a structure defined by its position in a social network. We do not have social relationships; we are our social relationships, so to speak (if this does not account for the whole of the reality of the self it does place a useful focus on a side of the self that is usually neglected or ignored). Each of the people we meet has a corresponding relational reality, and brings to ours a partially alien world which partly defines ours. We inhabit, or construct, a differen reality (partly different, provisional, interactional) with each of the people we interact with. Especially with the most significant persons.

Significant people define your reality with you, and you define theirs. Which is why many communities don't find it advisable for their members to have significant relationships (marriage, love, friendship) with members of other communities holding different beliefs—inhabiting another reality, so to speak. A foreigner's look threatens the very core of reality, it is an intrusion from another dimension. "There is no salvation outside the Church" —a doctrinal point which is given a more general, and rather ironic, reading, by Berger and Luckmann.  Individuals may inhabit a fairly consistent reality, or experience tensions between different realities which assert their claims. "The individual then faces a problem of consistency, which he can, typically, solve either by modifying his reality or his reality-maintaining relationships" (170). E.g. accepting that one is a failure, or turning to other people that give back a more satisfying image of oneself and our activities.  Human realities only partially overlap, and that there is often a conflict of realities among diverse social groups; see e.g. my paper on the battle for reality between the Gnostics and the early Christians, as portrayed in The Gospel of Judas ("La Visión del Templo: Espiritualidad antieclesiástica en el Evangelio de Judas y la Batalla por la Realidad"). There is a whole job of reality-management and reality-maintenance, especially in a globalized world in which different communities and different realities run into chaotic and absurd juxtapositions with each other:

"Reality-maintenance and reality-confirmation thus involve the totality of the individual's social situation, though the significant others occupy a privileged position in these processes" (Berger and Luckmann 171).

A continual interaction with significant others is thus the major vehicle for reality-management and reality maintenance. Conversation is singled out by Berger and Luckmann as the major mode of interaction (though love-making or sports can arguably be just as effective in many cases):

"The most important vehicle of reality-maintenance is conversation. One may view the individual's everyday life in terms of the working away of a conversational apparatus that ongoingly maintains, modifies, and reconstructs his subjective reality" (172)—conversation surrounded by non-verbal communication, and taking place "against the background of a world that is silently taken for granted" (172). One could thus modify Berger and Luckmann's account by saying that it is shared expectations or presuppositions (on which conversation rests, and which conversation helps to manage or modify) that constitute the most important tool of reality maintenance. Reality sustained by mental communication, then, of which actions and words only minimally modify the surface.  Casual conversation is then a crucial sign that the world stands in its place and is what it is; "its massivity is achieved by the accumulation and consistency of casual conversation—conversation that can afford to be casual precisely because it refers to the routines of a taken-for-granted world. The loss of casualness signals a break in the routines and, at least potentially, a threat to the taken-for-granted reality" (172). What is voiced out is singled out for attention; "conversation gives firm contours to items previously apprehended in a fleeing and unclear manner. One may have doubts about one's religion; these doubts become real in a quite different way as one discusses them." (173).

Conversations must be managed—Berger & Luckmann mention conversations through correspondence when physical conversations are not possible. "On the whole, frequency of conversation enhances its reality-generating potency, but lack of frequency can sometimes be compensated for by the intensity of the conversation when it does take place. One may see one's lover only once a month, but the conversation then engaged in is of sufficient intensity to meke up for its relative infrequency" (174).

One might as well note, too, the importance of reading as world-making conversation, reading (literature, philosophy, science, etc.), interacting with the dead, or with communities and worlds far away in time or space, sometimes to find a loophole to gaze out of the reality defined and circumscribed by our everyday life and by the conversation of our significant others, or, again, turning people living long ago and far away into our significant others. One might also expand on the prominent role of telephones and communication technologies in the present, as reality-management and reality-producing media.

Thus individuals manage their identities and realities, even when they are cut off from daily conversation with their reality-sustaining community. Rituals may be engaged in to keep this contact and prop up this reality. The "plausibility structures" as they are termed by Berger & Luckmann may become threatened and it is then that reality-sustaining strategies become more active and visible:

"In crisis situations the procedures are essentially the same as in routine maintenance, except that reality-confirmations have to be explicit and intensive. Frequently, ritual techniques are brought into play." (175). Taboos, exclusions, scapegoats, curses and exorcisms, etc. are used to sustain the official reality. "The violence of these defensive procedures will be proportional to the seriouness with which the threat is viewed" (176).

An extreme case noted by Berger and Luckmann is "world-switching" or conversion—when an individual leaves behind an old identity and its associated reality, and is "born again" into a new identity, often with the guide of significant others in the new sphere. "These significant others are the guides into the new reality. They represent the plausibility structure in the roles they play vis-à-vis the individual (roles that are typically defined explicitly in terms of their re-socializing function), and they mediate the new world to the individual (177). Religious conversion (Saul into Paul) is the model instance of such reality-switching. "The plausibility structures of religious conversion have been imitated by secular agencies of alternation. The best examples are in the areas of political indoctrination and psychotherapy" (178). Correspondingly, the reality-switching individual cuts off the ties and conversation with the old social sphere and previous significant others; "The alternating individual disaffiliates himself from his previous world and the plausibility structure that sustained it, bodily if possible, mentally if not" (178)—"Once the new reality has congealed, circumspect relations with outsiders may again be entered into, although those outsiders who used to be biographically significant are still dangerous. They are the ones who will say, 'Come off it, Saul', and there may be times when the old reality they invoke takes the form of temptation.

"And in conversation with the new significant others subjective reality is transformed. It is maintained by continuing conversation with them, or within the community they represent. Put simply, this means that one must now be very careful with whom one talks. People and ideas discrepant with the new definitions of reality are systematically avoided" (177-78).

One must be careful with what one reads, too, and with the films and TV programmes one watches. Representations of reality make and remake reality, and they sustain it all day long.

This analysis should be supplemented with a study of mechanisms of avoidance and coexistence—that is, communicative conventions and protocols which allow people to carry out interaction in some areas (e.g. work) with people sustaining other worlds or inhabiting other partial realities, without thereby challenging the hidden, private, different, eccentric or sacred aspects of their own reality. Thus it is advisable to avoid subjects such as politics, religion, etc. in casual conversation, especially if members of a minority creed are present. The weather is thus the safest interactional topic and the prime sustainer of the everyday reality we all share. Sports or celebrity TV are an area where conventional difference is encouraged, a symbol of those other differences which might threaten the plausibility of the world if they came into overt conflict. It is through heated differences on sporting matters that this issue is both recognized, hidden, and exorcized. Conversation on the weather and on sports and celebrities, which in their own ways are irrelevant topics, thus helps to sustain our sense of a coherent and shared social world.

Stuart Hall on Representation and Race

____

Interaction as Reality-Maintenance en Ibercampus.

 

 

—oOo—

Bibliografía sobre el SUJETO y el YO PERSONAL

Bibliografía sobre el SUJETO y el YO PERSONAL https://bibliojagl.blogspot.com/2024/07/sujeto-yo-personal.html

Tragedy and the Oedipal Subject: Shakespeare (and Freud)

 Tragedy and the Oedipal Subject: Shakespeare (and Freud) https://www.academia.edu/56657016/

Terrores metafísicos y otros problemas con la realidad

 

Retropost, 2014:

Entre los libros imprescindibles para conocer la estructura de la realidad, que no son tantos, suelo recomendar Frame Analysis de Goffman, o su Interaction Ritual o su Strategic Interaction, pero también The Social Construction of Reality, de Berger y Luckmann. 

Para mantener la realidad en estado puro es mejor no conocerla demasiado, sin embargo—son dos empresas divergentes, la de conocerla y la de mantenerla. Y las dos son todo un trabajo, pues ni se mantiene por sí sola—hay que apuntalarla constantemente con rituales y rutinas—ni desde luego se conoce por sí sola, que tiende a camuflarse detrás de esos rituales y rutinas y objetos cotidianos. Detrás de sí misma, por así decirlo. 

Berger y Luckmann señalan a la conversación como el instrumento más importante de mantenimiento de la realidad, pero en seguida vemos que no es tanto lo que se dice en la conversación como lo no dicho, las presuposiciones, lo que más contribuye a mantener la realidad. Es decir, que el conjunto de la realidad conspira para mantener la realidad, en sus lugares asignados. Sobre las presuposiciones y la realidad proyectada de antemano algo dije, a cuenta de Goffman, en este artículo sobre la realidad como expectativa autocumplida y el teatro de la interioridad. 

La vida cotidiana es de por sí tanto la realidad más accesible como el instrumento o técnica de mantenimiento de sí misma más eficaz. De Berger y Luckmann me llaman la atención hoy sus incursiones en las otras realidades marginales que rodean (y a la vez constituyen) a la vida cotidiana, extraña manera de constituirla, por el procedimiento de diferenciarse de ella. 

Quizá haya muchas personas sensibles a la inestabilidad o precariedad de la realidad, pero pocos autores lo son, o por lo menos no de esta manera tan reflexiva—las amenazas a la realidad, y los procedimientos para mantenerlas a raya, no suelen exponerse con tanta claridad como en este pasaje de La construcción social de la realidad:

As we have seen, the reality of everyday life maintains itself by being embodied in routines, which is the essence of institutionalization. Beyond this, however, the reality of everyday life is ongoingly reaffirmed in the individual's interaction with others. Just as reality is originally internalized by a social process, so it is maintained in consciousness by social processes. These latter processes are not drastically different from those of the earlier internalization. They also reflect the basic fact that subjective reality must stand in a relationship with an objective reality that is socially defined.
     In the social process of reality-maintenance it is possible to distinguish between significant others and less important others. In an important way all, or at least most, of the others encountered by the individual in everyday life serve to reaffirm his subjective reality. This occurs even in a situation as 'non-significant' as riding on a commuter train. The individual may not know anyone on the train and may speak to no one. All the same, the crowd of fellow-commuters reaffirms the basic structure of everyday life. By their overall conduct the fellow-commuters extract the individual from the tenuous reality of early-morning grogginess and proclaim to him in no uncertain terms that the world consists of earnest men going to work, of responsibility and schedules, of the New Haven Railroad and the New York Times. The last, of course, reaffirms the widest coordinates of the individual's reality. From the weather report to the help-wanted ads it assures him that he is, indeed, in the most real world possible. Concomitantly, it affirms the less-than-real status of the sinister ecstasies experienced before breakfast—the alien shape of allegedly familiar objects upon waking from a disturbing dream, the shock of non-recognition of one's own face in the bathroom mirror, the unspeakable suspicion a little later that one's wife and children are mysterious strangers. Most individuals susceptible to such metaphysical terrors manage to exorcize them to a degree in the course of their rigidly performed morning rituals, so that the reality of everyday life is at least gingerly established by the time they step out of their front door. But the reality begins to be fairly reliable only in the anonymous community of the commuter train. It attains massivity as the train pulls into Grand Central Station. Ergo sum, the individual can now murmur to himself, and proceed to the office wide-awake and self-assured.

E la nave va...

 

 

Un día pasó

 

—oOo—

Castillo de Montearagón - Historia viva

Bibliografía sobre la REALIDAD

 

Aprendiendo a esconderse - Learning to Hide

Retropost, 2014:

Una lección básica sobre la teatralidad de la vida cotidiana. A truth of masks, o the role of roles, tal como se expone en The Social Construction of Reality, de Peter L. Berger y Thomas Luckmann.

Los roles sociales se basan en la socialización secundaria que sigue a la socialización primaria del individuo—a su adquisición de una identidad social y de un mundo en la niñez: "La socialización secundaria es la internalización de 'sub-mundos' institucionalizados o basados en instituciones. Así pues, su extensión y su carácter quedan determinados por la complejidad de la división del trabajo y de la distribución social del conocimiento que va aparejada con ella" (1966: 158) "Esto hace posible separar una parte del yo y la realidad que la acompaña para considerarlos relevantes sólo para la situación específica del papel que esté en cuestión. Así, el individuo establece una distancia entre su identidad total y la realidad que va con ella por una parte, y la identidad parcial específica del rol o papel, y su realidad, por otra. Este importante logro se vuelve posible sólo una vez ha tenido lugar la socialización primaria. Dicho en términos simplistas, es más fácil que el niño 'se esconda' de su maestro que de su madre. Y conversamente, podemos decir que el desarrollo de esta capacidad 'de esconderse'  es una parte importante del proceso de crecer y volverse adulto" (1966: 162)

Social roles are based on secondary socialization following the individual's primary acquisition of a social identity and a world in childhood:   "Secondary socialization is the internalization of institutional or institution-based 'sub-worlds'. Its extent and character are therefore determined by the complexity of the division of labour and the concomitant social distribution of knowledge" (1966: 158) "This makes it possible to detach a part of the self and its concomitant reality as relevant only to the role-specific situation in question. The individual then establishes distance between his total self and its reality on the one hand, and the role-specific partial self and its reality on the other. This important feat is possible only after primary socialization has taken place. Put crudely once more, it is easier for the child 'to hide' from his teacher than from his mother. Conversely, it is possible to say that the development of this capacity 'to hide' is an important aspect of the process of growing into adulthood" (1966: 162)

Una cosa te voy a decir

—oOo—

Thomas Reid on Personal Identity

 

 


Dan Robinson gives the sixth of eight lectures on Reid's critique of David Hume at Oxford. In the third of his "Essays on The Intellectual Powers of Man", Thomas Reid devotes the fourth chapter to the concept of 'identity', and the sixth chapter to Locke's theory of 'personal identity'. This latter chapter is widely regarded as a definitive refutation of the thesis that personal identity is no more than memories of a certain sort, less a "bundle of perceptions". As he says, "This conviction of one's own identity is utterly necessary for all exercise of reason. The operations of reason—whether practical reasoning about what to do or speculative reasoning in the building up of a theory—are made up of successive parts. In any reasoning that I perform, the early parts are the foundation of the later ones, and if I didn't have the conviction that the early parts are propositions that I have approved or written down, I would have no reason to proceed to the later parts in any theoretical or practical project whatever".

Under "David Hume", the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins with, "The most important philosopher ever to write in English". His most formidable contemporary critic was the fellow Scot, Thomas Reid, the major architect of so-called Scottish Common Sense Philosophy. The most significant features of Hume's work, as understood by Reid, are the representive theory of perception, the nature of causation and causal concepts, the nature of personal identity and the foundations of morality. Each of these topics is presented in a pair of lectures, the first summarizing Hume's position and the second Reid's critique of that position.

 

Harold Pinter: Arte, verdad y política

Nuestra traducción del discurso de recepción de premio Nobel de Harold Pinter apareció en varios sitios, y desapareció también de un par de ellos Ahora puede verse aquí:

 

Harold Pinter:  ARTE, VERDAD Y POLÍTICA

https://www.academia.edu/104883546/

García Landa, José Ángel, and Beatriz Penas Ibáñez, trans. "Harold Pinter: Arte, Verdad, y Política: Discurso del Premio Nobel 2005." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 29 Dec. 2005:

         http://garciala.blogia.com/2005/122901-harold-pinter-discurso-del-premio-nobel-2005.php

http://garciala.blogia.com/2005/122902-harold-pinter-arte-verdad-y-politica.php

2005

_____."Arte, verdad y política." Nobel lecture by Harold Pinter. In Fírgoa: Universidade pública 9 Dec. 2005.

http://firgoa.usc.es/drupal/node/24005

         2005-12-09

_____. "Arte, verdad, y política." Nobel lecture by Harold Pinter. Trans. José Ángel García Landa and Beatriz Penas Ibáñez. Tinku.org (Dec. 2005).

         http://www.tinku.org/news_item.asp?NewsID=917

         2005 DISCONTINUED 2014

_____. "Arte, verdad, y política." Trans. José Ángel García Landa and Beatriz Penas Ibáñez. El mercurio (Dec. 2005).

http://www.mercurialis.com/prensa/discurso-h.pinter.htm

2005 DISCONTINUED 2014

_____. "Arte, verdad, y política." Nobel lecture by Harold Pinter. Trans. José Ángel García Landa and Beatriz Penas Ibáñez. In García Landa, Vanity Fea 29 Dec. 2005:

         http://garciala.blogia.com/2005/122902-harold-pinter-arte-verdad-y-politica.php

         2005

_____. "Art, Truth, and Politics de Harold Pinter (2005): Traducción de un texto culturalmente relevante." Transfer 8.1-2 (May 2013): 16-32.*

http://www.ub.edu/cret_transfer/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=225&Itemid=123&lang=es

2013 DISCONTINUED 2019

http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/transfer/article/view/17862

2019

_____. "Art, Truth, and Politics de Harold Pinter (2005): Traducción de un texto culturalmente relevante." From Transfer. Online at Raco.cat

         http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Transfer/article/download/269609/357149

         2014

_____. "Pinter: Arte, verdad y política." In García Landa, Vanity Fea 23 July 2014.*

         http://vanityfea.blogspot.com.es/2014/07/pinter-arte-verdad-y-politica.html

         2014

_____. "Arte, verdad y política de Harold Pinter (2005): Traducción de un texto culturalmente relevante." Academia 11 Jan. 2016.*

         https://www.academia.edu/20167814/

         2016

         https://www.academia.edu/104883546/

         2023

_____. "Harold Pinter: Discurso del premio Nobel." Trans. José Angel García Landa and Beatriz Penas Ibáñez. El Placard 17 April 2016.*

         http://el-placard.blogspot.com.es/2016/04/harold-pinter-discurso-del-premio-nobel.html

         2016

_____. "Arte, verdad y política: Discurso de Harold Pinter al recoger el Premio Nobel de Literatura en 2005." La Casa de mi Tía 22 Oct. 2023.*

         https://www.lacasademitia.es/articulo/politica/arte-verdad-politica-discurso-harold-pinter-recoger-premio-nobel-literatura-2005/20231022215306145796.html

         2023

Aquí hay otra traducción, en los subtítulos del vídeo en el que Pinter pronunció su discurso in absentia:

http://youtu.be/Tq3sQpSCvmo  

 

 

—oOo— 

La Primera Vez que Bailamos

 

Bloodlust 'The Revenger's Tragedy'

Based (loosely) on The Revenger's tragedy. 

 The Revenger's Tragedy, ascribed to Thomas Middleton, at Project Gutenberg: http://ebooks.gutenberg.us/WorldeBookLibrary.com/revenmid.htm

—and read in LibriVox (Internet Archive):
https://archive.org/details/revengers_tragedy_1308_librivox

Mejor sin nadie

Las cartas de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin a su prima Marguerite Teillar-Chambon durante los años de la Primera Guerra Mundial fueron editadas por ésta con el título P.Teilhard de Chardin: Génesis de un Pensamiento. En las cartas relata episodios de su vida como camillero y sacerdote en el ejército francés, y sobre todo medita sobre sus intuiciones teológicas y su relación con Dios, que encuentra a la vez consoladora y problemática, pues lejos aún de los misticismos evolucionistas del punto Omega, porfía Teilhard en la eterna trampa de intentar ver la historia y la humanidad como guiada y observada (nunca "caprichosamente atormentada") por un Dios personal, esa imposible mezcla de trascendencia cósmica y de "amigo imaginario" que lleva a las mentes a laberintos de espejos, incertidumbres intransitables y despeñaderos abisales—

Hold them cheap

May who ne'er hung there. 

Esfuerzos vanos o contradictorios cuando Teilhard intenta extraer una teodicea de las atrocidades y brutalidad estúpida de la guerra, viéndola como el lugar donde está la acción creativa del mundo, como un conflicto del mundo consigo mismo que lleva a un avance espiritual, a una mayor integración y una espiritualidad superior, etc. etc.... 

 En fin, entre las perplejidades a que se aboca Teilhard intentando justificar ante su prima el sentido divino de la labor de ambos, y buscando más luz en su relación con el Gran Amigo, hay un pasaje revelador—revelador de la otra cara del heroico camillero y del dedicado y piadosísimo sacerdote. Una cara de su personalidad podríamos decir muy poco cristiana, e incluso muy poco humana, aunque quiénes somos para decir lo que es poco humano o demasiado humano. En fin, que es una fea idea o una fea actitud o tendencia (fea a la vez que "muy devota y muy mística") que Teilhard confiesa a su prima en confianza aunque no exactamente como un pecado (y eso que no es algo como para irlo diciendo, aunque al parecer sí es publicable). 

Digo que no me parece muy cristiano, o muy "católico" al menos —pero ya avisaba Nietzsche contra una tendencia malsana en el cristianismo, el rechazo al mundo, el tanatismo o desprecio de lo existente en aras de un mundo mejor. Tendencia virtuosa o desprendida, que si se sale de madre puede inducir a actitudes francamente desagradables o indeseables.

Es un pasaje el que digo donde se juntan en Teilhard de modo inextricable el amor místico a Dios y un cierto satanismo presuntuoso y mefistofélico. Unas tentaciones solipsistas que ni Max Stirner las querría. Por no decir una prepotencia cósmica, un egoísmo galáctico, un elitismo de vértigo, un tanatismo ascético y una misantropía larvada que al parecer el buen sacerdote hacía mucho por no manifestar de maneras ofensivas en su día a día. 

En fin, ésta es la idea— que no digo yo que vaya a causar escándalo hoy. De hecho podría augurar un nuevo brote de teilhardismo entre los actuales animalistas, extincionistas y antinatalistas:

Por mi postal de anteayer, habrás sabido que he recibido tu carta del 10 de agosto [de 1917]. ¿No es curioso que ambos tengamos la misma debilidad, por la vida de contemplación egoísta, sin nada que la perturbe y donde ningún tercero (a menos que sea elegido para ello) se interponga inoportunamente entre los dos esenciales, el alma y Dios? Tienes razón, hay que reaccionar. Además, naturalmente hablando, el "otro" (es decir, todo el mundo, salvo una decena de humanos admitidos en nuestra órbita) es un intruso que nos importuna. Al menos, yo lo siento así, en algunos momentos. Intuitivamente, yo preferiría una tierra llena de bestias, a una tierra llena de hombres. Cada hombre tiene un pequeño mundo aparte, y este pluralismo me es esencialmente desagradable. Es preciso recordar que estamos en devenir, y que toda esta multiplicidad, por la caridad que Nuestro Señor nos exige, contrariamente a nuestros gustos, acabará por no ser más que uno... Es, sin duda, un aumento de esta Unidad, pagado con nuestro esfuerzo por salir de nosotros, lo que se traiciona por este aumento de nuestra vida interior, que sigue a la exteriorización caritativa de nosotros mismos, de que tú hablas. En estos momentos, como en los de sufrimiento providencial, se siente de una manera extraña que nuestra verdadera fuerza no está en nosotros, sino que nos viene de otra parte, cuando plegamos nuestra libertad a unas condiciones de existencia que no tienen nada de común con nuestras pequeñas combinaciones personales.

Quizá haya que ver en todo esto en parte un síndrome de la mili, con Teilhard a la vez fastidiado por la despersonalización del ejército o por el exceso de intimidad a que obliga, y fustigándose a sí mismo a sobrellevar lo que vaya viniendo, por la disciplina debida y por abnegación cristiana. En todo caso arrojan estas reflexiones una luz curiosa sobre la personalidad que llevó a Teilhard a su curioso apocalipsis divino o Big Crunch teológico en el que toda diferencia y contradicción se subsumen en un Dios autocontemplado que —por fin— está solo y absorto consigo mismo, una vez depurada su Noosfera, y superadas (aufgehoben) sus creaciones y meditaciones.

 

 

Nacimiento de la Noosfera

 —oOo—

Teoría de la desilusión

Retropost, 2014:

 La desilusión es parte crucial de la educación—sobre todo en el sentido de autoeducación, de educación a pesar de la educación recibida. O también en el sentido de maduración, o de aprender las lecciones de la vida. Es conveniente (o inevitable) desilusionarse, porque lo que se nos enseña son, en gran medida, ilusiones. Ilusiones que hay que aprender. Y para seguir aprendiendo, hay que desaprenderlas, y descubrir la desilusión: una verdad que quizá sea otra ilusión, pero que sin embargo produce un desencanto. Esto lo teorizan a su manera diversos sabios desilusionados, pero especialmente bien lo dicen Berger & Luckmann en La construcción social de la realidad.  Siendo la realidad no lo que su nombre nos haría suponer, sino una construcción social, una de muchas posibles, el aprender esto, o aprender a verla desde otro punto de vista, requiere desilusionarse—ver que las cosas que se daban por ciertas son relativas, o dudosas, o son símbolos, o ficciones. Desilusionarse es hacer filosofía, o semiótica social, y hacer filosofía, o semiótica social, es desilusionarse.

En la socialización primaria no existe un problema de identificación. No existe una elección de otros significativos. La sociedad presenta al candidato a la socialización un conjunto predefinido de otros significativos, a los que ha de aceptar como tales sin posibilidad de optar por otro arreglo. Hic Rhodus, hic salta. Hay que arreglárselas con los padres con los que el destino ha obsequiado a uno. Esta desventaja injusta, inherente a la situación de ser niño, tiene la consecuencia obvia de que , aunque el niño no es simplemente pasivo en el proceso de su socialización, son los adultos los que establecen las reglas del juego. El niño puede jugar el juego con entusiasmo, o con resistencia hosca. Pero, ay, es el único juego al que se juega. Esto tiene un corolario importante. Ya que el niño no tiene elección a la hora de seleccionar a sus otros significativos, su identificación con ellos es casi automática. Por la misma razón, es casi inevitable que interiorice la realidad particular de ellos. El niño no interioriza el mundo de sus otros significativos como un mundo posible entre otros. Lo interioriza como el mundo, el único mundo existente y concebible, el mundo tout court. Es por esto que el mundo interiorizado en la socialización primaria está mucho más firmemente atrincherado en la consciencia que los mundos interiorizados en socializaciones secundarias. Por mucho que se debilite la sensación original de inevitabilidad a lo largo de desencantos sucesivos, el recuerdo de una certidumbre que jamás se ha de repetir—la certidumbre del alba primera de la realidad—se adhiere todavía al primer mundo de la infancia. La socialización primaria lleva a cabo, por tanto, lo que (visto retrospectivamente, claro) puede considerarse como el engaño más importante que la sociedad le vende al individuo: hacer que aparezca como necesario lo que de hecho es un amasijo de contingencias,  y hacer de ese modo que adquiera sentido el accidente de su nacimiento. (Berger y Luckmann, 154-55)

Las creencias y ritos religiosos suelen ser víctimas tempranas de estos ejercicios de desilusión. Muchos estiman que es de buen tono mantener la ficción social de la religión aunque no se crea en ella. Y es una postura que tiene su justificación, porque una vez se empieza a desmoronar la solidez del mundo recibido de la infancia, no está claro dónde se puede trazar un límite a su potencial disolución. Si el infierno, y luego el cielo, resultan ser ilusiones, no tarda en seguirles la tierra, no tan sólida como parecía una vez se la examina de cerca. 

Y tampoco resultan ser espejismos más sólidos, desde luego, la sustancia misma del sujeto que reflexiona, y la del nuevo mundo social que le rodea y que ha ocupado, más precariamente, el lugar de las antiguas certidumbres. La filosofía, entendiendo por tal la crítica y disolución de los mitos heredados, nos lleva a habitar en un mundo extraño e incierto, donde ni el pensamiento, ni nada más, puede tomar asiento.

 

Un fantasma viviente en 'Little Gidding'

 

 

The (In)Definition of Reality: Reframing and Contested Topsight

 The (In)Definition of Reality: Reframing and Contested Topsight https://www.academia.edu/32351646/

The 2014 Garrick Lecture

Event Dates: 25 June 2014
Rose Theatre,
24-26 High Street,
Kingston, KT1 1HL

Kingston University and the Rose Theatre Kingston present:

The 2014 Garrick Lecture

by

Simon Callow CBE

Simon Callow CBE – The 2014 Garrick Lecture

David Garrick’s Kingston connections date from 1754, when he bought the house beside the Thames known ever after as Garrick’s Villa, and built his Shakespeare Temple, where he would be famously painted by Zoffany. So, as part of the 2014 Kingston Connections programme of events, Kingston University and the Rose Theatre will jointly host an academic conference to celebrate the great Shakespearean actor and director and commemorate his legacy to the Royal Borough.

Actor, manager, playwright, versifier, Garrick excelled in many parts, and was possibly both the most praised and vilified cultural celebrity of his generation. Authors whose plays he rejected and performers he did not employ were not sparing in their attacks. “Garrick and Shakespeare” seeks therefore to focus on his achievements as a Shakespearean interpreter and impresario, and to re-examine Garrick’s controversial reputation.  ONLINE AUDIO HERE   (Backdoor Broadcasting Company discontinued.... now online at the Internet ARchive, ONLINE AUDIO HERE).

Introduction by Professor Richard Wilson (Kingston):
download 

The 2014 Garrick Lecture
download 

Closing Remarks by Professor Richard Wilson (Kingston):
download 

West Side Story en Huesca

 

Sally Simpson (3)

Fuera Traidores

 

"Fuera Traidores."

https://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2024/06/fuera-traidores.html

 

 

Catherine Belsey: Shakespeare and the Real (Lacan and Shakespeare symposium)

Roméo&Juliette

 

Le Roi Soleil comédie musicale

MALINCHE

 

#MALINCHE es una obra de ARTE que está siendo objeto de un ataque de fuerzas oscuras dirigidas por la @policia de Marlaska.
APOYEMOS A NACHO CANO! pic.twitter.com/mW9aTXnVmk

— Guillermo Rocafort (@GuillermoRocaf1) July 11, 2024

Panorámica de los panoramas

 Panorámica de los panoramas: O, el Panóptico en panóptico: https://www.academia.edu/34215601/

Ali Baba la musicale comédie

 

Starmania (Édition Rouge, 1989)

Retropost, 2014:

"Quand nos enfants auront vingt ans....."

Qué atrás queda el futuro. Aquí, por fin, Starmania, pas trop tôt:

_____. "Starmania Edition Rouge 1989." Rock opera by Michel Berger and Luc Plamondon. Réjane Perry, Sabrina Lory, Wenta, Richard Groulx, Norman Groulx, Martine Saint Clair, Renaud Hantson, Peter Lorne, Luc Laffite, Florence Davis. Video. Spectacles Camus Coullier, Hachette Premiere et CIE, UGC, Apache. Théâtre Marigny. Stage design by Michel Berger and Luc Plamondon. (Warner Music Vision). YouTube (WENTA D) 9 March 2015.*

https://youtu.be/4iD0ByK3Iq8

         2024

—oOo—

Notre Dame de Paris

La Voix Humaine

Poulenc, Francis. La Voix humaine: Tragédie lyrique en un acte. Libretto by Jean Cocteau. Dame Gwyneth Jones. Un film d'opéra inspiré du spectacle crée en mai 1989 au Théâtre du Chaâtelet, dir. Stéphane Lissner. Réalisation Hugo Santiago, dir. Alain Françon. Ensemble Orchestral de Paris / Serge Baudo. La Sept – FR3 – Le Théâtre du Châtelet – Caméras Continentales, 1989.

         https://youtu.be/t0fJWQQTLQU

         2024

 

 

—oOo—

Sumisión

Su misión: Sumisión (Ya lo predijo Houellebecq). https://t.co/el1NX5F1HP

— JoséAngelGarcíaLanda (@JoseAngelGLanda) July 7, 2024

Hell House

 

Corral de Comedias de Robres

 

Mylène Farmer - California (Live à Bercy '96)

Techo del Teatro Romano

 

Plot

 Retropost, 2014: Plot (Bibliography): https://vanityfea.blogspot.com/2014/07/plot-bibliography.html

The Cuban episode

A psychodrama with 5 main characters: Ernest Hemingway, Adriana Ivancich, Dora Ivancich, Mary Welsh Hemingway and Gianfranco Ivancich:

 

"The Cuban episode presented a psycho-drama with five characters in the style of playwright Tennessee Williams: The main actor reduced to a tragic, ridiculous figure; the young girl, fascinated by the world famous writer, letting herself being exploited as the object of desire, not fully understanding the consequences; the mother irresponsibly supporting her daughter in her role; the wife, accepting the impossible situation, and losing part of her self-respect; the brother profiting as a substitute of love. And there is the general public that can follow what happens on the scene and backstage."

From Jobst C. Knigge,

Hemingway's Venetian Muse Adriana Ivancich: A Contribution to the Biography of Ernest Hemingway. New version 2012. Online at e-doc Server - Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.*

         https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/bitstream/handle/18452/14177/2338BeAlC0Lcw.pdf

Je viens faire mon personnage

Según Bossuet, citado por Jean d'Ormesson (Et moi je vis toujours, 167):

C'est bien peu de chose que l'homme, et tout ce qui a fin est bien peu de chose. Il n'y a que le temps de ma vie qui me fait différent de ce qui ne fut jamais. J'entre dans la vie avec la loi d'en sortir, je viens faire mon personnage, je viens me montrer comme les autres; après, il faudra disparaître.

The Unbelievers | Richard Dawkins & Lawrence Krauss | Full Documentary Film

Teatro Romano del Monte San Nicola